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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, A Limited Partner-
ship, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, INC., No. 19096 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE MAURICE HARDING, JUDGE, and 
HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE, presiding. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by an owner of land against an engi-
neering firm for damages proximately caused by the negligent 
surveying and staking of the owner's property. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This matter was tried to a jury, Maurice Harding, Dis-
trict Judge pro tern, presiding, on November 17, 18, and 19, 
1980. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and 
assessed damages of $30,000. R. 101, 107. Judge Harding 
subsequently granted defendant's motion for a new trial. R. 
140. The case was again set for trial, before David Sam, 
District Judge, on March 1, 1983. At the time set for trial, 
the District Court ruled that John Price Associates, Inc., 
the plaintiff's contractor, was an indispensable party, and 
later dismissed the action upon plaintiff's election not to 
amend the complaint to add John Price Associates, Inc. as a 
party. R. 147-48. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff requests that the District Court's order grant-
ing a new trial be reversed and the matter remanded with in-
structions to enter judgment for the plaintiff, or, in the 
alternative, that the District Court's order granting a new 
trial be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial on 
the issue of damages only, or, in the further alternative, 
that the District Court's order dismissing the action for 
failure to join an indispensable party be reversed and the 
matter remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are established by the pleadings and 
the evidence adduced at the trial of this matter. Sometime 
during the first part of July, 1973, the defendant agreed to 
survey and stake the corners of certain property belonging to 
the plaintiff in preparation for the construction of the Orem 
-2-
plaza Shopping Center in Orem, Utah. Plaintiff's Amended 
complaint alleged that defendant agreed to survey and stake 
the property for plaintiff. R. 10. The defendant's Answer 
to Amended Complaint admitted that the plaintiff retained the 
services of Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc. R. 13. 
The defendant performed the survey and staked the prop-
erty corners. Tr. Vol. I at 202, R. 366. In fact, the 
defendant staked two sets of property corners, one for a 
fenceline and one for the title line. Tr. Vol. I at 216, R. 
380. Russell Brown testified that defendant knew the differ-
ence between the two sets of stakes and that the survey's 
field notes reflected the difference. Id. Mr. Brown also 
testified that plaintiff relied upon defendant to stake the 
property corners. Id. Following the survey, the defendant 
certified, on July 27, 1973, by and through its agent Carr F. 
Greer, that plaintiff's property had been properly staked to 
represent the boundaries shown on the signed surveyor's cer-
tificate, dated July 27, 1973. Tr. Vol. I at 153, R. 317. 
Pltf. Ex. 4. 
During the fall of 1973, John Price Associates, Inc. 
("JPA"), the contractor for the project, began grading, 
placing fill, and compacting, in order to have the site 
prepared for construction in the spring of 1974. Tr. Vol. I 
at 27, R. 191. On June 6, 1974, JPA issued a purchase order 
-3-
to the defendant for, among other things, staking of the 
building corners of the Skaggs building. Tr. Vol. I at 
45-46, R. 209-10. Def. Ex. 7. The Skaggs building was the 
first portion of the Orem Plaza Shopping Center scheduled for 
construction. The Skaggs building was to be followed by con· 
struction of a large restaurant area, small shop space, and 
two free-standing buildings, all as part of the development 
of the shopping center. 
On June 14, 1974, David Thurgood, an engineer employed by 
defendant, took a surveying team to the site and contacted 
the superintendent, Jim Marshall. Tr. Vol. I at 246, R. 
410. Mr. Thurgood took with him a copy of the construction 
plans, a site plan and other drawings dealing with construe· 
tion of the building, but did not take the survey done by 
defendant the previous summer or the survey field notes. Tr. 
Vol. I at 246, 259, R. 410, 423. Mr. Marshall requested Mr. 
Thurgood to stake the four corners of the building and then 
place offset stakes from those four corners to permit excava· 
tion for the footings. Tr. Vol. I at 248, R. 412. 
Because of the proximity of the Skaggs location to the 
northwest corner of the property, Mr. Thurgood used that cor-
ner as a starting point to lay out the building. Tr. Vol. I 
at 248-49, R. 412-13. The corner was marked with a one inch 
diameter rebar, and a one inch by two inch wooden stake. 
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"N.W. property corner" was written on the wooden stake, in-
dicating that the rebar marked the northwest property cor-
ner. Tr. Vol. I at 264, R. 428. The survey performed by 
defendant the previous summer indicates that the property 
corners were marked with one inch diameter rebars. Tr. Vol. 
I at 265, R. 429. Pltf. Ex. 4. Although Mr. Thurgood did 
not know specifically who put the wooden stake by the one 
inch diameter rebar, he testified that it would have been the 
same person that placed the pin, i.e., "representatives of 
persons that performed the survey of Rollins, Brown & Gunnell 
Tr. Vol. I at 267, R. 431. Russell Brown testified 
that some of the reference points shown on the survey were 
used in staking the building corners, Tr. Vol. I at 154, R. 
318, and that defendant had in fact staked the property cor-
ners. Tr. Vol. I at 202, R. 366. 
Using the northwest corner as a starting point, Mr. 
Thurgood and his crew sighted along the west boundary line 
and came down the line the indicated distance. They then 
turned ninety degrees to the west property line and staked 
the buidings corners and placed offset stakes. Tr. Vol. I at 
251-52, R. 415-16. The crew then traversed back to the 
northwest corner. Id. 
On July 15, 1974, the defendant was requested by Mr. 
Marshall, the construction superintendent, to stake the curb 
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and gutter along the south side of 200 North Street (which 
was directly north of the Orem Plaza Shopping Center proj-
ect). Tr. Vol. I at 252, R. 146. On July 17, 1974, Mr. 
Thurgood and his crew began to perform that work. Id. Once 
again, the northwest corner was used as the starting point. 
Id. The defendant's crew proceeded to stake the curb and 
gutter until Mr. Thurgood noticed that the line which was 
being staked would intersect the east boundary of the prop-
erty farther south of the northeast corner than it should 
have. Tr. Vol. I at 253, R. 417. After obtaining the survey 
from defendant's office and verifying the distances and prop-
erty corners as shown thereon, Mr. Thurgood discovered that 
the northwest corner, which had been used as the starting 
point to stake the Skaggs building, was 30 feet south of the 
northwest corner shown on the site plan. Tr. Vol. I at 
253-54, R. 417-18. Russell Brown admitted that the Skaggs 
building was not staked out in proper relation to the prop-
erty corners as shown on the plot plan. Tr. Vol. I at 201, 
R. 365. 
Defendant contacted JPA and informed it of the error on 
July 17, 1974. Tr. Vol. I at 255, R. 419. A couple of days 
later, representatives of defendant and JPA met at the job 
site to discuss the problem. Id. During the month between 
the time the building corners were staked and the time the 
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error was discovered, construction had moved forward con-
siderably on the Skaggs building. For example, between June 
14 and July 17, approximately 235 cubic yards, or 20 to 25 
truckloads, of concrete were poured. Tr. Vol. I at 101-02, 
R. 266-67, Def. Ex. 8. Most of the concrete poured was for 
footings and the slab for the Skaggs building. Tr. Vol. I at 
31, 72-73, R. 195, 236-37. Most of the interior footings 
were completed, including re-enforcing steel and bolts. Id. 
A large number of the slabs, approximately fifteen to twenty 
thousand square feet, had been poured. Id. Plumbing and 
electrical work was in place under the slabs since that work 
could not be installed after the slabs were poured. Id. A 
small amount of concrete was poured for curb and gutter. Tr. 
Vol. I at 75, R. 239. On July 18, 1974, the day after defen-
dant discovered the staking error, the first tilt-up panels 
were poured. Tr. Vol. I at 102-03, R. 266-67. Other tilt-up 
panels had been formed. Tr. Vol. I at 31, R. 195. 
After discovering the staking error and consulting with 
representatives of JPA, defendant was requested to prepare a 
survey showing the actual location of the Skaggs building 
with respect to the property boundaries. Tr. Vol. I at 256, 
R. 420. Defendant prepared this survey, which showed that 
the Skaggs building was located approximately 30 feet south 
of its intended location. Tr. Vol. I at 256, 258, R. 420, 
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422, Pltf. Ex. 5. If plaintiff had continued to build the 
shopping center as planned, the building would have extended 
over the south property line. Tr. Vol. I at 38, R. 202. 
Several possible remedial measures were explored, Tr. 
Vol. I at 72, R. 236; however, due to financing, costs, and 
lease limitations, plaintiff ultimately decided to absorb the 
30 foot error by shortening the shop space planned for the 
south end of the shopping center. Tr. Vol. I at 39-40, R. 
203-04. In order to allow for the surveying error and to 
avoid building the shopping center across the south property 
line, in the latter part of July, 1974, plaintiff instructed 
the architect to redesign the shop space. Tr. Vol. I at 40, 
Vol. II at 58, R. 204, 524. Since the shop space was de-
signed for a depth of 70 feet, Tr. Vol. II at 52, R. 518, 
this resulted in the loss of 2100 square feet of shop space. 
Tr. Vol. II at 59, R. 525. 
Other alternatives suggested by defendant and considered 
by the plaintiff in attempting to minimize the damage caused 
by the surveying error were rejected as incompatible with the 
time constraints imposed by plaintiff's financing commitment, 
excessively expensive in terms of increased construction 
costs, and/or economically impracticable. The primary con-
sideration in determining what to do was the completion dead-
line imposed by Aetna Life Insurance Company, which had com-
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mitted to provide a 30-year mortgage loan of $1,900,000, with 
interest at 8.75%. Tr. Vol. I at 39, R. 203, Pltf. Ex. 2. 
The commitment expired on January 30, 1975, and Aetna was not 
required to disburse any funds prior to November 18, 1974. 
Pltf. Ex. 2. As a means of paying the commitment fee of 
$38,000 to Aetna, the plaintiff provided two letters of 
credit payable to Aetna, each in the amount of $19,000. Tr. 
Vol. I at 25-26, R. 189-90, Pltf. Ex. 3. In the event the 
loan closed on or after November 18, 1974, but on or before 
November 30, 1974, the entire commitment fee of $38,000 was 
to be returned to the plaintiff. Id. In the event the loan 
closed on or after December 1, 1974, but on or before Decem-
ber 30, 1974, one-half of the commitment fee, or $19,000, 
would be returned to the plaintiff. Id. If the loan closed 
after December 30, 1974, but before the commitment expired on 
January 30, 1975, Aetna was entitled to retain the entire 
commitment fee. Id. 
In order to close on the Aetna loan, plaintiff was re-
quired, by the loan commitment and mortgage loan application, 
to have the Skaggs building substantially completed. Tr. 
Vol. I at 25, R. 189, Pltf. Ex. 1 and 2. Thus, delays in 
construction could risk the loss of up to $38,000 in commit-
ment fees, and perhaps the entire funding commitment. Tr. 
Vol. I at 34-35, R. 198-99. John Price, the general partner 
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of plaintiff, was seriously concerned that the delay caused 
in construction by attempting to move the Skaggs building 30 
feet to the north would jeopardize the Aetna loan commit-
ment. Id. In actual fact, the funding deadline was barely 
met. Tr. Vol. II at 63, R. 529. 
Lease restrictions prevented plaintiff from recouping the 
lost frontage at any other economically feasible area on the 
property. Skaggs, the anchor tenant for the shopping center, 
would not permit any building to be built on its north side 
or directly in front of the Skaggs store, the only available 
locations. Tr. Vol. I at 62-63, Tr. Vol. II at 30-31, R. 
226-27, 496-97, Pltf. Ex. 11. In short, there was no way to 
find an additional 30 feet of frontage. 
Since the economic value in the shopping center is found 
in the frontage available, and not purely in the size of the 
structure, plaintiff did not consider it feasible to deepen 
the shop space or build additional space in the back of the 
mall. Tr. Vol. I at 99, R. 263. The shops were planned to 
be 70 feet deep. Adding additional depth to the shops was 
not economically practicable since the additional space would 
have been unleaseable. Tr. Vol. I at 39, 54, 71, 127-28, R. 
203, 218, 235, 291-92. Two free-standing sites had already 
been planned for the area in front of the shop space and 
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restaurant; therefore, that space was unavailable to pick up 
the lost frontage. Tr. Vol. I at 55, R. 219. 
Finally, defendant suggested and plaintiff considered the 
option of resituating the Skaggs Drug Center 30 feet north of 
where it had actually been built. Russell Brown, one of the 
principals of the defendant, testified that there were no 
electrical installations in the concrete at the time he ob-
served the project in early September, 1974. Tr. Vol. I at 
172-73, R. 336-37. There was one plumbing stub. Tr. Vol. I 
at 173, R. 337. Mr. Price testified that some electrical and 
plumbing work had been set in the concrete that had been 
poured. Tr. Vol. I at 75, 115, R. 239, 279. 
Mr. Brown made an estimate of the cost involved in imple-
menting the repairs he contemplated. Tr. Vol. I at 173, R. 
337. The work generally involved removing the south 30 feet 
of concrete of the Skaggs buiding, disposing of that concrete 
in some manner, regrading that area, grading the north 30 
feet of the Skaggs building, pouring concrete along the north 
30 feet of the building, including laying in reinforcing 
steel, and moving any electrical and plumbing equipment which 
had been put in place. Tr. Vol. I at 173-74, R. 337-38. Mr. 
Brown estimated that all of the foregoing work could be 
accomplished at a cost of approximately $3,000. Tr. Vol. I 
at 173-76, R. 337-40. Mr. Brown also testified that this 
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work could be accomplished in ten working days, assuming a 
contractor, the equipment and the personnel were immediately 
available to perform the work. Tr. Vol. I at 208-09, R. 
372-373. 
Mr. Price testified that the remedy advocated by Russell 
Brown was not feasible since the column spacings and footings 
were not placed at uniform distances corresponding to the 
thirty foot surveying error. Instead, "the footings were set 
at varying distances corresponding to the placement of the 
tenant's gondolas, aisles and refrigeration equipment. Tr. 
Vol. I at 100-101, R. 264-65. The footings could not be 
moved. Tr. Vol. I at 76, R. 240. Only total replacement 
would cure the problem. Tr. Vol. I at 76, 103, R. 240, 267. 
Moving the whole building would require 30 to 90 days, de-
pending upon negotiations with subcontractors and tenants, 
and securing authorization from the tenant. Tr. Vol. I at 
103, R. 267. 
Mr. Price estimated the total cost of repair at approxi-
mately $100,000. Tr. Vol. I at 75, R. 239. The repairs 
would cost thirty to forty thousand dollars for repouring the 
concrete alone. Id. In addition, the costs of repair had to 
include the risk of increased cost resulting from renegoti-
ating with contractors and materialmen. Tr. Vol. I at 36, 
39, R. 200, 203. The bids upon which JPA relied had been 
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submitted six months previously and the costs of construction 
had gone up substantially in the meantime. Tr. Vol. I at 75, 
R. 239. Thus, asking the subcontractors to do additional 
work on the project would subject JPA to a possible escala-
tion of the cost of other work to be performed under the 
subcontracts and materials to be supplied. Tr. Vol. I at 36, 
R. 200. 
At the trial of this matter, a real estate appraiser 
testified as to plaintiff's damages. Ralph Wright, an MAI 
appraiser, examined the property and prepared a report, which 
was admitted into evidence. Tr. Vol. II at 42, R. 508, Pltf. 
Ex. 12. Mr. Wright used two methods to assess plaintiff's 
loss. First, using an annuity approach over the probable 
economic life of the project, Mr. Wright estimated the pres-
ent value of the plaintiff's lost net income at $80,598. Tr. 
Vol. I at 125, R. 289. Second, by comparing the value of the 
property as built to the value of the property if constructed 
as planned, Mr. Wright estimated the present value of the 
loss at $72,351. Tr. Vol. I at 126, R. 290. In the second 
approach, Mr. Wright concluded that the land alone would have 
increased in value $30,000 had the plaintiff fully developed 
the property as planned. Pltf. Ex. 12. Based upon these fig-
ures, Mr. Wright concluded that the present value of plain-
tiff's loss was $75,000. Tr. Vol. I at 126, R. 290. Defen-
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dant offered no direct evidence on the loss of value of the 
land or future net income. 
At the trial of this matter in 1980, the jury returned a 
verdict in the amount of $30,000 in favor of the plaintiff. 
R. 101, 107. Several days later, the defendant moved for 
judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, for a remittitur or a 
new trial. R. 126. On January 12, 1981, Judge Maurice 
Harding granted the motion for a -new trial on the ground 
"that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict". 
R. 140. After further briefing by the parties, the court 
reaffirmed its decision of January 12, 1981, and noted "that 
a new trial should be granted in this case on the basis that 
the damages were excessive and on the basis that there was no 
culpable negligence on the part of the engineers." There-
after, the case was set for a new trial. 
On March 1, 1983, the day set for trial, Judge David Sam, 
upon consideration of a trial brief filed by defendant, con-
cluded, sua sponte, that John Price Associates, Inc. (the 
contractor for the Orem Plaza Project) was an indispensable 
party in the matter. R. 147-48. The district court granted 
the plaintiff ten days within which to amend its complaint 
and add John Price Associates, Inc. as an indispensable 
party, or suffer a dismissal of the action. Id. The plain-
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tiff elected not to amend the complaint, and the action was 
dismissed pursuant to Judge Sam's order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT 
A NEW TRIAL. 
As noted above, at the trial of this matter the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and assessed 
damages of $30,000. Later, Judge Harding granted the defen-
dant's motion for a new trial. The district court's ruling 
was erroneous since the record contains no substantial compe-
tent evidence to support a verdict for the defendant. 
The standard under which this court will review a trial 
court's decision on a motion for a new trial depends upon 
whether the trial court has denied or granted the motion. 
Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1982). Where, as 
in this matter, the trial court has granted a motion for a 
new trial, the Supreme Court will affirm on appeal if the 
record reflects "substantial competent evidence which would 
support a verdict for the [moving party]." King v. Union 
Pacific R. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 53, 212 P.2d 692, 698 (1949). 
In granting defendant's motion for a new trial, the 
district court held "that the evidence was insufficient to 
justify the verdict." R. 140. A review of the record, how-
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ever, reveals that there is no substantial competent evidPnce 
to support a verdict for defendant, either on the issue of 
liability or the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff. 
The negligence of defendant in staking the corners of 
plaintiff's property was well established by the pleadings 
and the evidence at trial. The undisputed testimony was that 
defendant staked the property corners for plaintiff in the 
summer of 1973. The northwest property corner was marked by 
one inch diameter rebar and a wood stake. The evidence is 
undisputed that the rebar and wooden stake were placed by the 
defendant. The evidence is likewise undisputed that the 
northwest property corner was marked about thirty feet south 
of the point indicated by the survey. In fact, the defendant , 
admitted, in its answer to plaintiff's amended complaint, 
that it "erroneously set the stakes on plaintiff's prop-
erty.• R. 10-11, 13-14. Defendant also stated, in its 
answer to the amended complaint: "The defendant, Rollins, 
Brown' Gunnell, Inc., admits that a mistake was made in 
staking of the plaintiff's property by one of its agents and 
employees, but denies that the plaintiff has suffered damaged 
by reason thereof." R. 14. At the trial, defendant re-
quested that the court instruct the jury that the defendant, 
Rollins, Brown ' Gunnell "has admitted liability in this 
case.• R. 32. This instruction was not given by the court. 
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considering all the evidence adduced at the trial of this 
matter and the admissions contained in the pleadings, the 
record lacks substantial competent evidence to support a 
verdict for defendant on the issue of liability. 
On the issue of damages, substantial competent evidence 
to support a verdict for the defendant is likewise absent. 
The defendant's evidence respecting damages was solely on the 
issue of mitigation. The trial court erred in considering 
and submitting to the jury the defendant's evidence respect-
ing mitigation of damages, since the issue was not raised as 
an affirmative defense as required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah County 
School District, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that mitigation of damages is an affirma-
tive defense required to be pleaded under Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(c), or the defense is waived, Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). Con-
sequently, this evidence was not relevant, not admissible, 
and not competent to support a verdict for the defendant. 
Defendant presented no direct evidence on the value of 
the rental space or use of land lost as a result of defen-
dant's mis-staking of the property corners. Instead, defen-
dant argued that at the time the error was discovered the 
Skaggs building could have been moved about 30 feet to the 
north at a cost of approximately $3,000. The defendant did 
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not contend that at the time of trial moving the Skaggs 
building was feasible. The issue presented was whether the 
plaintiff acted reasonably, at the time the error was dis-
covered to minimize the damages resulting from defendant's 
negligence. Plaintiff objected to defendant's testimony on 
mitigation on the grounds that it was not placed in issue by 
the pleadings and was inadmissible under the rules set forth 
in Pratt, supra. The objection overruled by the trial 
court, Tr. Vol. I at 171, R. 335, and the issue was submitted 
to the jury. R. 95. 
The trial court erred to the extent it relied upon such 
evidence and considered issues beyond the pleadings in grant-
ing defendant's motion for a new trial. In determining 
whether there was substantial competent evidence to support a 
verdict for defendant on the issue of damages, this court 
sh0uld disregard evidence relating to mitigation of damages. 
Even if one assumes that the defendant properly raised 
the issue of mitigation of damages, defendant failed as a 
matter of law to demonstrate that the plaintiff did not act 
reasonably to avoid the consequences of defendant's negli-
gence. The general rule is that an injured party may not 
recover damages flowing from a defendant's act which reason-
ably should have been avoided. Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 
425, 428 (Utah 1936). However, the plaintiff is only re-
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quired to act as "an ordinarily prudent man" would be ex-
pected to act under like circumstances. Id. Thus, the 
defendant has the burden of showing not only that the plain-
tiff could have reduced its damages, but that doing so was 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
An injured party's duty to minimize damages does not 
require it to "enter into other risky contracts, incur un-
reasonable inconvenience or expense, [or] disorganize [its] 
business." Barbara Oil Co. v. Patrick Petroleum Co., 566 
P.2d 389, 393-94 (Kan. App. 1977) (quoting Restatment of Con-
tracts§ 336, Comment (a)). The Restatement also notes, "It 
is not reasonable to expect the plaintiff to avoid harm if at 
the time for action it appears that the attempt may cause 
other serious harm." Id. See also Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 350, Comment (g) (1981). 
When analyzed under the foregoing standard, plaintiff, as 
a matter of law acted reasonably to avoid the damages flowing 
from defendant's negligence. Perhaps more importantly, de-
fendant presented no substantial competent evidence that 
plaintiff acted unreasonably. Mr. Brown testified that the 
repairs would take ten working days, assuming that the con-
tractor, equipment and personnel were immediately available 
to perform the work. Tr. Vol. I at 208-09, R. 372-73. The 
fact that plaintiff had a deadline to substantially complete 
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the Skaggs building in order to meet a commitment for long 
term financing was not contested by defendant. Failure to 
complete the building by November 30, 1974, would have meant 
the loss of $19,000 (one-half of the loan commitment fee). 
Failure to deliver a substantially complete building by 
December 30, 1974, would have meant the loss of an additional 
$19,000. If the building was not substantially complete by 
January 30, 1975, the entire funding commitment would have 
been lost. Plaintiff did not act unreasonably in refusing to 
risk its financing by moving the Skaggs building and delaying 
its completion. 
In addition, it was plaintiff's judgment that the repairs 
advocated by defendant were not feasible and that the only 
way to change the location of the Skaggs building was to tear 
out all of the concrete which had been poured for the foot-
ings and slab. Instead of defendant's suggested cost of 
$3,000, plaintiff estimated that it would cost $100,000 to 
repair the consequences of the error. Defendant presented no 
evidence that plaintiff's judgment as to cost of repair was 
unreasonable. 
Even if one assumes that plaintiff could have moved the 
Skaggs building thirty feet north at a cost of $3,000 and 
still completed the building on time; nevertheless, defendant 
presented no evidence that plaintiff acted unreasonably in 
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failing to do so. The acts of plaintiff must be judged in 
light of the circumstances prevailing at the time action was 
needed. As a matter of law, the plaintiff was not required 
to take the risk advocated by defendant. 
The pleadings and the evidence presented at trial demon-
strate that there was no substantial competent evidence to 
support a verdict for defendant on either the issue of lia-
bility or damages. In short, the district court erred in 
granting defendant a new trial. This Court should reverse 
the district court's order granting a new trial and remand 
with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict for plain-
tiff. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the district 
court's order granting a new trial and remand for a new trial 
on the issue of damages only. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT JPA 
WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY AND IN DISMISS-
ING THE ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S ELECTION 
NOT TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT. 
John Price Associates, Inc. ("JPA") was the contractor 
for plaintiff on the Orem Plaza Shopping Center. JPA issued 
the purchase order pursuant to which defendant staked the 
corners of the Skaggs building. At the time set for the 
second trial of this case, defendant submitted a trial brief 
arguing, in part, that, under Utah R. Civ. P. 19, JPA was an 
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indispensable party to the action. The district court ruled, 
sponte, that JPA was a indispensable party and granted 
plaintiff ten days within which to amend its complaint to 
name JPA as a party, or suffer dismissal of the complaint. 
Plaintiff elected not to name JPA as a party: consequently, 
the amended complaint was dismissed. 
Since JPA was neither a necessary nor indispensable 
party, the district court erred .in dismissing the action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) states: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of sub-
division (b) of this rule, persons having a joint 
interest shall be made parties and be joined on the 
same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a per-
son who should join is a plaintiff refuses to do so, 
or his consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a 
defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plain-
tiff. 
Defendant argued that JPA had a joint interest with plain-
tiff, since JPA issued the purchase order to defendant to 
stake the Skaggs building and was the real party in inter-
est. Although there is some confusion in the defendant's use 
of labels, it appears that the district court believed that 
there was no privity of contract between plaintiff and defen-
dant and, therefore, plaintiff had no cause of action. How-
ever, since there was a contract between JPA and defendant, 
JPA had a cause of action and, in turn, was liable to plain-
tiff. 
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JPA cannot be considered to be a necessary or indispensa-
ble party under Rule 19, since it has no joint interest in 
the action with plaintiff. The only party damaged by the 
defendant's failure to properly stake the property corners 
was plaintiff, the owner of the property. Since JPA suffered 
no damage, it has no joint interest in the action. Also, the 
defendant admitted in its pleadings that it had been retained 
by plaintiff to stake the property corners. The damages suf-
fered by plaintiff were proximately caused by the erroneous 
staking of the northwest corner of the property, since that 
corner was used as the starting point to stake the the cor-
ners of the Skaggs building. Thus, the negligent act for 
which plaintiff seeks damages arises out of a contract be-
tween plaintiff and defendant, not between JPA and defendant. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the contract out of which plain-
tiff's damages arose was between defendant and JPA, rather 
than between defendant and plaintiff, plaintiff's amended 
complaint nevertheless states a cause of action against 
defendant in tort. Plaintiff may independently maintain an 
action against defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the 
circumstances giving rise to the tort claim may also justify 
a breach of contract claim. 
In Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Utah 1976), 
the court stated: "This court has never ruled as to whether 
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there must be privity of contract between a surveyor and a 
party who sustains damage, because of a surveyor's negligent 
misrepresentation." While the opinion in Bushnell is some-
what unclear, the court appears to adopt the rule of Restate-
ment of Torts S 552: 
One who in the course of his business or profession 
supplies information for the guidance of others in 
their business transactions is subject to liability 
for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the 
information if (a) he fails.to exercise that care 
and competence in obtaining and communicating the 
information which its recipient is justified in 
expecting, and (bl the harm is suffered (i) by the 
person or one of the class of persons for whose 
guidance the information was supplied, and (ii) 
because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a 
transaction in which it was intended to influence 
his conduct or in a transaction substantially 
identical therewith. 
Id. at 1286 n. 4. In Bushnell, the court noted that the 
plaintiffs (adjacent property owners) were not within the 
class of persons for whose guidance the information was 
supplied by the surveyor. 
The court adopted a similar rule in Milliner v. Elmer Fox 
& Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). In Milliner, purchasers of 
stock brought an action against an accountant to recover for 
the loss of value of the stock. The plaintiffs alleged that 
they purchased shares of stock in a company in reliance upon 
financial statements prepared by the accounting firm, that 
the financial statements were false, and that the accountants 
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were negligent in the preparation of the financial state-
ments. The accountants raised lack of privity of contract as 
a defense; however, the court held: 
We are of the opinion that the lack of privity is 
not a defense where an accountant who is aware of 
the fact that his work will be relied on by a party 
or parties who may extend credit to his client or 
assume his client's obligations. A future purchaser 
of shares of stock of a corporation, however, be-
longs to an unlimited class of equity holders who 
could not be reasonably foreseen as a third party 
who would be expected to rely on a financial state-
ment prepared by an accountant for the corporation. 
Id. at BOB. Thus, the existence of a duty does not depend 
upon a contract, but upon the foreseeability of injury to a 
specific party. Certainly, it is foreseeable that the owner 
of real estate will be injured by a surveyor's negligence. 
If a duty is owed to plaintiff in this action, JPA can in no 
way be construed as a necessary or indispensable party. 
The California Court of Appeals considered the issue 
raised by Rollins, Brown & Gunnell in Kent v. Bartlett, 49 
Cal. App. 3d 724 (1975), wheren the plaintiffs-land owners 
brought an action for damages caused by defendant-surveyor's 
negligent performance of a contract to survey property. The 
trial court granted judgment for defendant after plaintiffs' 
opening statement on the ground that there was no privity of 
contract. The California court reversed, holding that defen-
dant could reasonably anticipate that the survey would be 
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relied upon by plaintiffs, subsequent purchasers of the prop-
erty, and therefore owed a duty to plaintiffs. See Rozny v. 
Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E. 2d 656 (1969). 
Although denominated a dismissal for failure to join an 
indispensable party, it appears that the trial court's deci-
sion was based upon the erroneous belief that plaintiff had 
no independent cause of action defendant for negli-
gence. The damage to plaintiff, as owner of the property 
surveyed and staked, was foreseeable; therefore, defendant 
owed a duty to plaintiff to refrain from negligent acts. The 
court's order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to 
join JPA was in error and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in grantng defendant a new trial 
since there was no substantial competent evidence to support 
a verdict for defendant. The district court likewise erred 
in ruling that JPA was a necessary and indispensable party. 
The Court should reverse the orders of the district court and 
remand with directions to reinstate the jury verdict, or, 
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alternatively, remand for a new trial on damages only, or, in 
the further alternative, remand for a new trial. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1983. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
George:H\J n t 
Bryce D. Panzer 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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